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JENNIFER J. ROCHOW* 
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED 
STATES LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. FOURTH SOKOL COL-
LOQUIUM. EDITED BY RiCHARD B. LILLICH. Charlottesville, VA: The Michie 
Co., 1981, 245 pp., cloth. 
It is difficult to know in what terms to judge this book. The Acknowl-
edgements section I describes the book's genesis: the yearly Sokol Colloquia at the 
University of Virginia School of Law, "bringing together distinguished scholars, 
practitioners and government officials from here and abroad to present papers 
and share ideas,"2 and the understandable desire to preserve and disseminate 
what the Colloquia produced - for the first two years by publishing "many"3 of 
the papers together in a law review symposium format,4 moving in the third year 
to a hardcover edition of that year's "principal"5 papers,6 and arriving in the 
fourth year at this hardcover edition of "all"7 the papers delivered at the 1980 
Colloquium on "International Aspects of Criminal Law". The first thing to 
realize, with regard to this book, is that colloquia being what they are, "all" is 
probably too many of any such group of papers to publish. Unevenness (in terms 
of utility to the neophyte, of sophistication, of breadth of perspective, of quality 
of reasoning, of familiarity with analogous areas) which may be tolerable or even 
desirable under live conditions becomes inappropriate and disruptive when 
papers are published in a collection (however clearly they are labeled). A reader 
has a right to expect more of what is published, and the disappointment one feels 
by the end of this book infects even the best papers with frustration. 
More than anything else, these writers needed to be forced to interact with one 
another; at the very least, they needed to be encouraged to live up to common 
standards regarding documentation and reasoning, addressing themselves to a 
common audience, so that the reader could attempt the interaction which the 
book fails to provide. The areas the book covers (which are better described in 
* Jennifer J. Rochow is Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School; B.A., Bennington 
College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author is also a member of the Massachusetts 
bar. 
I. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAw: ENFORCING UNITED STATES LAw IN THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY, FOURTH SoKOL COLLOQUIUM at vii-viii (R. B. Lillich ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as FOURTH 
SOKOL]. 
2. [d. at vii. 
3. [d. 
4. 17 VIRGINIA J. INT'L LAw 359-493 (1977); 18 VIRGINIA J. INT'L LAw 609-751 (1978). 
5. FOURTH SOKOL, supra note I, at vii. 
6. THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, THIRD SOKOL COLLOQUIUM (R. B. Lillich ed. 1980). 
7. FOURTH SOKOL, supra note I, at vii. 
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the Forewords and in the chapter headings than in the title) - that is, the ways in 
which nations try to enforce their own criminal laws outside their national 
boundaries (or choose to enforce each other's) - are surely areas of interest to a 
wide variety of readers, from international legal scholars to lawyers interested in 
tales like "The French Connection" and "Midnight Express" to law school pro-
fessors with an eye out for material suitable for a course in comparative criminal 
procedure. To the book's (or the Colloquim's) credit, it does bring together a 
good range of interested and interesting persons (from a Wellesley College 
Political Science Professor to a couple of Assistant Legal Advisors from the State 
Department to a practicing District of Columbia lawyer to a variety of law school 
professors)9 - but it brings them together only physically, not intellectually. The 
authors seem to feel entirely free to decide how much they will interact with each 
other (if at all), and over what, and even whether they will speak a common 
language (so that an energetic reader can at least attempt some of the synthesis 
which the authors have sidestepped.) Now I am not saying that I would relish the 
job of trying to bring such an interaction about, or that it would make it easy to 
get people to agree to be colloquium participants, if such interaction were 
required. Nevertheless, having chosen to publish these papers, it seems to me (in 
my admittedly safe role as exacting reader) the more editorial leadership could 
have greatly improved this book, and it is a major disappointment that this did 
not happen. 
Let me begin with the question of to whom this book is addressed, and let me 
assume that, in the absence of any disclaimer to the contrary, it ought to be 
accessible to the intelligent and educated neophyte. For this neophyte reader, 
the quality of the footnotes is one thing which becomes crucial. Good footnotes 
keep the reader from being confounded by the writer's assumptions about his 
knowledge (of the cases, of the terms, of the events); they help the reader 
understand and assess some otherwise inscrutable or bald conclusions in the text; 
they alert the reader to opposing views in disputed areas, or to common confu-
sions which might interfere with understanding the text; and they provide the 
rudiments of a bibliography for exploring particular areas further. Many of 
these articles provide footnotes along just these lines; the first article, for exam-
ple, by Professor Evans,lo thoughtfully includes quick factual summaries of the 
cases cited,!1 and short descriptions of events or of sequences of events with 
which the reader might be unfamiliar,12 which help provide a context in which to 
understand what is being discussed in the text. Similarly, the article by Professor 
8. Id. at v. 
9. Id. at 229. 
10. Id. at 1-14. 
II. See, e.g., id. at 4 n.12, which describes who was fleeing where in each case cited involving 
prosecution of military personnel stationed abroad. 
12. See, e.g., id. at 9 n.35, regarding the abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina. 
1983] INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAw 639 
Saltzburgl3 offers its analogies to issues in American criminal procedure with 
sufficient footnoting 14 to enable a non-specialist to follow his reasoning to his 
detailed proposals and conclusions. ls However, instances of less helpful ap-
proaches are found sprinkled throughout the book. Professor Nanda's article, 
for example, refers to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine without explanation; 16 surely this 
is not such a major doctrine that every reader would have instant recall of its 
substance without assistance. And Professor Paust, who so consistently provides 
alternative perspectives to those which other authors have taken for granted, 
fails to use some of his footnotes to maximum advantage as well. For example, as 
he is calling attention to the somewhat ambiguous quality of the "protection" 
offered American citizens under the exchange of prisoner treaties, he footnotes 
his mention of diplomatic protection thus: "In no case has diplomatic protection 
included actual incarceration. Moreover, diplomatic protection is a process 
which occurs at the international level. It has nothing to do with domestic 
incarceration."17 Now while this offers the reader an interesting thought, it 
offers him no means of exploring it further; if it occurred in the text, it would 
require a footnote - as a footnote, it passes by in this conclusory and unsubstan-
tiated condition. (It is only a partial consolation, in this situation, that most of 
Professor Paust's footnotes are much more helpful.) 
It is this freedom to take unsupported potshots (or to ignore the conflicts or 
inconsistencies that might have inspired them) which makes this kind of book 
frustrating. For example, Professor Paust surely raises an interesting point when 
he suggests that the pro-prisoner exchange treaty writers have become so en-
tranced with their ends (bringing the Billy Hayes of this country back from 
Turkish prisons even if to American prisonsl8 ) that they have tended to gloss 
over the means. Ignored, he says, is the question of whether our federal govern-
ment has the power, under our Constitution, to imprison persons who have been 
prosecuted, "not for a violation of out law, but for a violation of foreign law in a 
foreign tribunal using foreign procedures."19 What Professor Paust then pro-
ceeds to do, however, is to concentrate on the means (which he finds unconstitu-
tional20) without ever adressing the ends - which ,the readers may find as 
frustrating as the reverse. Similarly, Professor Paust questions whether the 
13. ld. at 107-54. 
14. See, e.g., id. at 131 n.98, which describes the exclusionary rule; and id. at 136 n. 115, which lists the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement regarding searches. 
15. See the two-pronged analysis proposed (regarding the applicability of constitutional standards to 
conduct abroad) (ld. at 147) and illustrated by application to a specific fact situation (ld. at 149-51). 
16. ld. at 170, Contrast Professor Evans' succinct reference to the same doctrine.ld. at 8 n.31. 
17. ld. at 209 n.14. 
18. See B. HAYES, MIDNIGHT EXPRESS (1977). 
19. FOURTH SOKOL, supra note I, at 204. 
20. ld. at 206-07. He asserts the means are unconstitutional because the Constitution does not grant 
any power to the executive to imprison for violation of a domestic law not authorized by Congress in a 
tribunal not authorized by Congress. 
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federal government can really so blithely disassociate itself from the means used 
to secure the foreign convictions which, after the prisoner is exchanged, result in 
incarceration in this country.21 Is it really so obvious, as Professor Stephan 
concludes, that "the Court's pronouncements establish as a bedrock principle 
that the United States does not violate the Constitution when it accepts custody 
of a person knowing he has been abused by a foreign sovereign?"22 The two 
authors never really engage. Professor Stephan footnotes Professor Paust's posi-
tion, dismissing him summarily: "I do not understand him to argue seriously that 
Supreme Court authority supports his all-encompassing notion of complicity, as 
a matter of logic and policy his interpretation seems insupportable."23 Professor 
Paust never mentions Professor Stephan, and himself avoids much of the issue 
by phrasing his questions in terms of U.S. government "involvement" in foreign 
state "illegalities" (by this latter he seems to mean foreign state behavior which 
would violate our Constitution if our government engaged in it).24 The reader is 
left with the impression of two shadow boxers unwilling to come out and contest 
each other directly. 
There are many instances of failure to engage throughout the book, on many 
different levels. One question frequently raised, for example, is who does (or 
should) our Constitution protect?25 Part of one's reasoning with regard to this 
question will depend on one's view of the Constitution; is it "a compact between 
the people of the United States and its government, creating enforceable rights 
and duties running between each of the parties"?26 Or is it a "limit on the power 
of the central government"27 which "controls the activities of U.S. law enforce-
ment officers wherever they occur"?28 Professor Saltzburg, who unilaterally does 
most of the interacting that is done in this collection, refers briefly to Professor 
Stephan'S position29 but no real debate ever takes place. 
Aside from specific issues which are never debated, there are a number of 
underlying themes about which the authors clearly have very different assump-
tions, but which they do not directly address. An example of this kind of 
subsurface tension may be found in the ways in which the authors refer to the 
executive, the judicial and, to a lesser extent, the legislative branches, and to the 
balance of power or expertise among them. Mr. Fields, an Assistant Legal 
Advisor at the Department of State, predictably takes the view that U.S. magis-
trates (when deciding whether an accused may appropriately avail himself of the 
21. [d. at 221. 
22. [d. at 58. 
23. [d. at 58 n.60. 
24. [d. at 205. 
25. E.g., Uf. at 36; "I. Who Enjoys Constitutional Protection?" 
26. [d. at 43 (Professor Stephan). 
27. /d. at 109 (Professor Saltzburg). 
28. [d. at 113 (Professor Saltzburg). 
29. [d. at 114-15 nn.29 & 30. 
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"political offense" exception to extradition) need the assistance of official gov-
ernment witnesses30 (such as himself) in order to reach a correct and informed 
decision. Curiously then, although Mr. Fields goes to great lengths to praise a 
particular magistrate's willingness to accept and be guided by such testimony, 
and indeed quotes a full four pages from her opinion,31 there is an underlying 
patronizing tone to his praise. His efforts to commend her ability to distinguish 
between conclusions (which are hers to draw) and evidence (which witnesses 
might appropriately give) break down when one notices that the excluded area 
cited (regarding the existence of a political conflict in the Middle East32), while it 
might be seen as conclusory, is hardly less so than the admitted area cited (Mr. 
Fields' testimony that the State Department viewed the act in question as a 
common crime and not as one of a political character33). 
Professor Stephan may be seen as expressing similar views more directly; he 
sees the Executive and Congress as best able to assess certain factors which in his 
view necessarily become involved as soon as other countries become involved,34 
and for this reason he opposes judicial oversight of certain government actions 
(those in a hostile host country, for example), arguing that the government 
ought to be free to engage in "irregular," i.e., unconstitutional, behavior abroad, 
if that seems necessary to protect u.S. interests.3s Admittedly this is a very 
different context from the magistrate's hearing above; yet the theme, that the 
executive is better fit to make certain determinations, and should be permitted to 
do so (whether by offering a conclusory expert opinion in a judicial proceeding 
or by elimination of judicial examination of an issue in the first place), is surely 
similar. Furthermore, in neither case is there a full discussion of why the execu-
tive is so clearly better suited to make which kinds of decisions (whether covertly 
or overtly) or of what might be lost by permitting it to do SO.36 Professor Stephan 
suggests, for example, that "one hardly can imagine a less appealing spectacle 
than that of judges weighing and balancing the worth of particular foreign policy 
objectives in a given case."37 Aside from one's concern for the nascent condition 
of Professor Stephan's imagination, is this so clearly an outrageous activity for 
judges to be engaging in? It is precisely the kind of activity the magistrate 
engages in in deciding the political offense question, except that in that instance 
30. [d. 
31. [d. at 25-30. 
32. [d. at 24-25. 
33. [d. at 23. 
34. [d. at 49. 
35. [d. at 44. 
36. E.g., the benefits of separation of powers, whatever they are; a less immediately political assess-
ment of questions which are arguably legal, not political; and whatever protection court scrutiny 
allegedly provides from government excesses or politically motivated judgments. The rest of this 
paragraph discusses possible losses which are dismissed (not discussed) by the authors. 
37. FOURTH SOKOL, supra note I, at 49. 
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the magistrate is weighing and balancing the objective of the PLO,3B for exam-
ple, or of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republic (sic) Army,39 rather than 
that of the U.S. government. Is it so clear, as Professor Stephan argues, that 
government misconduct abroad will not "infect" domestic government behav-
ior?40 Or that our citizens living abroad do not need judicial oversight of our 
government's behavior with regard to them, because "far greater threats to their 
civil liberties often are faced in their country of residence than those posed by 
our government"?41 
Naturally, not all the authors in this volume share this preference for execu-
tive control of decision-making. Professor Paust, for example, suggests that: "any 
attempt by the Executive and the Senate to force a judicial recognition of all 
relevant foreign penal judgments through a treaty provision should be struck 
down as an indelicate attempt to interfere with judicial powers."42 Although he 
frames his remarks in terms of what is constitutionally permissible, he appears to 
make some underlying assumptions. Since the debate is carried on at the level of 
assumptions and rhetoric, the reader has little ground on which to begin making 
rational judgments and distinctions. 
A more consistent level of interaction might also have forced the authors to 
back up their arguments in more detail, and to incorporate more arguments by 
analogy to other areas, especially criminal procedure areas. Many of the impor-
tant areas discussed - when does the government's indirect involvement be-
come substantial enough to invoke constitutional protections; how meaningful is 
a waiver given under conditions of mental and physical stress; what are the 
arguments in favor of excluding inappropriately obtained evidence in court; 
what is meant by deterrence, or by protection of judicial integrity and what are 
the alternatives - have analogs or counterparts, which would provide a starting 
point from which to assess the options in these emerging and relatively unexam-
ined situations. Too often, such analogies remain undiscussed (and therefore, 
one fears, unrecognized) and even where mentioned may be so superficially 
dealt with that anyone familiar with their complexities must cringe. For example, 
when Professor Stephan cites the so-called silver platter cases43 as a model for 
how to deal with the question of government complicity, one familiar with their 
place in the evolution of fourth amendment law will be inclined (as Professor 
Saltz burg is 87 pages later44) to dismiss not only his support of his position but, as 
38. As in the Abu Eain case, described in id. at 21. 
39. As in the McMullen case, described in id. at 20. 
40. Id. at 44. See analogously Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437,4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 
(1960), which discusses the frustration of state policy which occurs when a federal court admits evidence 
lawlesslly obtained by state agents; presumably this tolerance in a federal forum "infects" state agent 
behavior in the state context as well, or there would be no "frustration" of state policy. 
41. FOURTH SOKOL, supra note 1, at 44. 
42. [d. at 218. 
43. Id. at 58 n.59. 
44. [d. at 145·46 n.142. 
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a result, his position itself - the silver platter doctrine worked so poorly that it 
became an important motivating factor in the adoption of the exclusionary rule. 
Another even more intrusive example of what appears to be naivete comes 
when Professor Stephan makes the following statement: "the truth-finding pro-
cess will be unimpaired no matter how violent the defendant's capture may have 
been."45 This statement appears to assume that truth-finding is the goal of the 
criminal proceeding. While it may be a goal, and while debate continues over 
whether it ought to be made more of a goal,46 one wonders how much familiarity 
an author can possibly have with the Bill of Rights to imagine that there are not a 
variety of other values being protected by our criminal process - values which 
might easily be implicated in the violent capture of the defendant.47 Later, in 
Professor Paust's discussion of waiver (in the context of the exchanged prisoner 
agreeing to waive his right to contest his foreign conviction, and consenting to his 
transfer to a U.S. prison to serve his sentence), comparison with other situations 
involving waiver and consent seems called for. Professor Paust states that "an 
individual cannot grant a power to the federal government that does not exist"48 
by virtue of a waiver - or by any other means. It is difficult to understand what 
he means by this, absent any illustration: one may consent to a search of one's 
home when the government has failed to procure a warrant, even if the failure is 
not simply a matter of procedure, i.e., that the government could have obtained a 
warrant but has not, but rather a matter of impossibility, i.e., where the govern-
ment possesses no grounds on which to base an application.49 Surely, in a narrow 
sense, both consents give the government a power that does not otherwise exist 
45. !d. at 62. 
46. See, e.g., Frankel, The Searchforthe Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975). "Many 
of the rules and devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it are not geared for, but are often aptly 
suited to defeat, the development of the truth." !d. at 1036. Judge Frankel then goes on to suggest 
alterations in the presently defined roles of prosecution and defense which could encourage more of a 
search for truth, although he closes with the caution that one might ultimately have to choose between 
truth and liberty. [d. at 1059. See also Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1951). "Justice is 
something larger and more intimate than truth. Truth is only one of the ingredients of justice." [d. at 12. 
See also Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, from THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149 
(1968), who contrasts a crime control model of criminal justice with a due process model, neither model 
interestingly enough, having truth as its primary objective. 
47. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,72 S.Ct. 205,96 L. Ed. 183 (1952), an unusually 
graphic example of the intrusion of other values into the truth-finding process. Mr. Rochin was 
indisputably factually guilty, and yet the manner of his arrest and the investigation of his case (which 
included struggling to open his mouth and forcibly pumping his stomach) so offended the court that his 
conviction was reversed on due process grounds. Every exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence marks similarly the elevation of some other value over that of truth-finding. The very existence of 
a right not to incriminate one's self, while it may be seen as protecting a variety of values, has as a cost 
the elicitation of information which in a high proportion of cases would be truthful. 
The alternative, of course, is that the author is aware of these complexities, and is merely choosing his 
phrasing as a tactical means of advancing what he believes should be the most important emphasis in the 
proceedings. 
48. FOURTH SOKOL, supra note I, at 219. 
49. See 2 W. R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1 (1978). 
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(and in the second situation substantially so). If Professor Paust had been forced 
into more discussion and less rhetoric,50 the reader might have ended up less 
aggravated and more informed. 
An alternative to this enforced interaction might have been to separate the 
subject matters of the articles (it is their overlap which is most revealing of their 
unevenness) or, at least, to label them more clearly. Mr. Timberg's article, for 
example, on Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidence in U.S. Antitrust Cases: The 
Uranium Cartel Maelstrom is a pleasure to read not only because it is well written 
and incorporates a variety of perspectives, including a critical slant on each, but 
also because it benefits from its failure to overlap (especially if it is without 
engaging) any of the other articles. A collection of similarly isolated articles 
would place the authors' failure to interact in a different posture altogether. An 
article like Mr. Dalton's, which reports a fair amount of interesting information 
but does very little synthesizing,51 suffers by not being labeled as reportage, and 
by being placed in close proximity to Professor Paust's article covering much of 
the same material, though from a far more critical perspective. Professor Nanda, 
who begins an interesting discussion of what he has been describing (Enforce-
ment of U.S. Laws at Sea - Selected Jurisdictional and Evidentiary Issues) ever 
so tentatively during his one page conclusion,52 needed to be encouraged to do 
more. In addition, Nanda suffers from his proximity to and overlap with Profes-
sor Saltz berg's article, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the 
United States, particularly when the reader necessarily contrasts his summary 
treatment of the Warren case, for example,53 with Professor Saltzburg's in depth 
treatment of the same case only thirty pages earlier.54 Similarly, editorial inter-
vention might easily have improved the quality of Mr. Fields' article, Bringing 
Terrorists to Justice - The Shifting Sands of the Political Offense Exception. Although it 
begins fairly strongly and objectively, it degenerates in Part II (which does not 
follow any officially designated Part I) into what is really a pitch for a redefinition 
of "political" along lines he likes better, without discussion of the alternatives55 
and which culminates in a melodramatic, and arguably racist,56 conclusion: "we 
can conclude that the sands of the political offense exception are definitely 
50. He is fond of phrases such as "any child might know" (FOURTH SOKOL,supra note 1, at 226), or "as 
any perceptive child might point out"·(Id. at 211), and refers twice in 13 pages to Humpty Dumpty. (ld. 
at 212 and 225). 
51. The closest he comes is a kind of "61n the one hand, on the other hand" sequence.ld. at 191. 
52. Id. at 176-77. 
53. Id. at 157. 
54. Id. at 116-28. 
55. E.g., discussion of an objective or subjective standard by Professor Carbonneau, Id. at 69, which 
might have been further enriched by a comparison with other objective or subjective standards, e.g., 
regarding custody. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed. 2d 497 
(1980). 
56. The author seems to locate heinous terrorism in robed men in sandy places. 
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shifting away from the terrorist who seeks to cloak his heinous act with the robe 
of political justification."57 
Would I recommend this book? To a reader who is able to accept its modestly 
stated goal (to "stimulate future research and reform in the areas discussed"58), 
yes - I learned a good deal from it, in spite of its frustrations, and it has left me 
with a number of questions and angles I would like pursue. However it would be 
a mistake to imagine that it repesents a unified effort at a comprehensive and 
critical exploration of the areas named. Should one attempt to read it as one 
would a treatise, it will disappoint; should one attempt to read it as a casebook, it 
will provide plenty of struggle, but without the sense that there is a set of 
integrated aims being served by that struggle - a condition under which one's 
expectations are bound to feel betrayed. One might well have enjoyed attending 
the conference which begat this book, (where, after all, one is free to choose to 
ask a speaker to confront that which he appears to be avoiding) without recom-
mending that too much more than browsing, introductory attention be given to 
its transcript. 
57. FOURTH SOKOL, supra note 1, at 33. 
58. !d. at vii. 
